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Abstract
This work presents an overview of four different approaches to the
problem of future contingency and determinism in temporal logics.
All of them are bivalent, viz. they share the assumption that proposi-
tions concerning future contingent facts have a determinate truth-value
(true or false). We introduce Ockhamism, Peirceanism, Actualism and
T ×W semantics, the four most relevant bivalent alternatives in this
area, and compare them from the point of view of their expressiveness
and their underlying metaphysics of time.
Keywords : Determinism, Temporal Logics, Future Contingents, Ac-
tualism, Ockhamism, Peirceanism, T ×W .
1 Introduction
A major problem for schoolmen was to reconcile divine foreknowledge with
future contingency, this last being a prerequisite for human free choice. In
modern times when theological concerns are less pressing, the so-called fu-
ture contingents problem has shifted back to the more mundane Aristotelian
question of how to accommodate the latter with the principle of bivalence,
i.e. the thesis that all propositions, including those concerning future con-
tingent facts, are either true or false. Both problems amount to the same
if one assumes that only true propositions may be known (nihil scitum nisi
verum) and that God has a full science about the future. But if one doesn’t
care much about God’s omniscience, then this puzzle becomes less urgent
and one may just solve the dilemma by discarding one of its horns, i.e. the
principle of bivalence. This is what most of the contemporary approaches
to future contingency do (see Belnap and Green (1994), Thomason (1970),
MacFarlane (2003)).1
1The forerunner of all these solutions has been considered by many scholars (but not
all of them) to be Aristotle in chapter IX of On Interpretation.
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Nonetheless, there are many reasons for preserving bivalence. Logical
simplicity is perhaps the most instrumental of them. Others are related
to language expressivity and the fact that non bivalent approaches seem
mostly unable to distinguish simple truths about the future from settled
truths about it.
There are several bivalence-preserving solutions to the future contingents
problem. Many of them were already known to the scholastics (see Øhrstrom
(2009)). We will present those which have preserved their relevance up to
nowadays: Ockhamism, Peirceanism (both formulated by Prior), actualism
and W × T semantics. All of them (except maybe Peirceanism) have been
inspired by the medieval tradition. The advantage of contemporary tensed-
logical approaches lies in their rigor and their comparability, mostly due to
the fact that they all have the same semantic format.
There are no shared desiderata for a best choice among these solutions.
Metaphysical considerations, tacit or explicit, about the “real” structure of
time play a major role in the discussion and may easily turn into an “ideo-
logical” debate. Nonetheless, it is instructive to compare how the different
approaches account not only for the openness of the future, but also for
some additional intuitions about time and truth. One of these is retrogra-
dation of truth. When one evaluates ex post a sentence like “there will be
a sea-battle tomorrow” she is driven to assign a determinate truth-value
to it and say, for example, that this sentence was true (in case a sea bat-
tle is actually taking place).2 Related to retrogradation is a more general
concern about expressivity: the formalism should account for the intuitive
meaning of different tensed constructions in natural language. This means
that the the language and its semantics must be able to express the different
truth-conditions of propositions like the following.
(1) There will be a sea-battle tomorrow.
(2) Laws of physics will hold tomorrow.
(3) There is a sea-battle, so it was true yesterday (but not settled) that
there would be a sea-battle.
(4) The coin will come up heads. It is possible though, that it will come
up tails, and then later it will come up tails again (though at that
2This is MacFarlane’s determinacy intuition (see MacFarlane (2003), p. 322) as op-
posed to the indeterminacy intuition (future contingent sentences are neither true nor
false at the moment of utterance).
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moment it could come up heads), and then, inevitably, still later it
will come up tails yet again.3
(5) There is a sea-battle, but there could have been none.
In the next section we will present in detail Ockham’s analysis (recon-
structed by Prior) of the future contingents problem. In sections 3-6 we will
introduce the four mentioned bivalent logical systems for solving it and dis-
cuss how they fare with respect to retrogradation and sentences like (1)-(5).
A. Prior deserves the merit for having formulated two of them, in Chapter
VII of his Past, Present and Future. He also deserves huge credit for in-
troducing, in the same place, their common branching-time semantics, even
though, as we will explain later, he did not grant them a major philosophical
relevance.
2 Ockham’s argument
We freely adapt Ockham’s version of the argument leading from divine fore-
knowledge to the necessity of the future as exposed in his Tractatus de
Praedestinatione (1320 ca.). Ockham carefully reconstructs the argument
in order to isolate two fundamental premises of it and to eventually reject
one of them. The first premise is
(P1) Necessarily, if God knew in the past that p, then p.
which is on a par with the standard epistemic principle that knowledge
implies truth, formulated by the medievals as nihil scitum nisi verum. The
second premise is
(P2) If it has been the case that p, then necessarily it has been the case
that p,
that we can represent in a temporal language4 as
Pp→ 2Pp
3This example is taken from Belnap and Green (1994)
4Our language consists of atomic formulas p, q, ... (to be read as “pure” present-tense
sentences such as “there is a sea battle”) and recursively built on Boolean operators ¬
(“ not”), ∧ (“and”), ∨ (“or”), → (“if - then”), the temporal operators F (“it will be the
case that”) and P (“it has been the case that”) and an additional operator 2 to be read
as “it is necessary that”. We will also make use of dual operators like G := ¬F¬ (“it will
always be the case that”), H := ¬P¬ (“it has always been the case that”) and 3 := ¬2¬
(“it is possible that”).
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and which goes under the name of the principle of necessitation of the past
(PNP): quod fuit, non potest non fuisse. The kind of necessity involved
here is not logical but historical necessity, or necessity per accidens as the
medievals called it: what has been the case is (historically) necessary, for it
is not any longer possible for it not to have been the case.
If we apply (P2) to divine foreknowledge we get as a first conclusion:
(C1) If God knew in the past that p, then necessarily God knew in the
past that p.
A third premise is derived from the modal schema, 2(p→ q)→ (2p→
2q), known as schema K, which states that “if a conditional and its an-
tecedent are necessary, then the consequent is also necessary”. A special
instance of it is
(P3) If (necessarily, if God knew that p, then p), then (if necessarily God
knew that p then necessarily p).
By Modus Ponens from (P1) and (P3) we obtain
If necessarily God knew that p then necessarily p.
and finally, by (C1) and transitivity :
If God knew that p, then necessarily p.
If p is a future-tensed statement, such as “I will be sitting tomorrow”
(or Ockham’s favorite example “Peter will be chosen”), then future-tensed
statements are necessary and determinism follows – by assuming divine fore-
knowledge or bivalence, which here amount to the same.
Ockham points out that this argument lies essentially on (PNP):
This argument is based on the proposition that a singular propo-
sition true about the past is necessary. Therefore if “this is
white” is true now, “this will be white was true” is necessary.
Consequently, it is necessary that it happens, and it cannot come
about otherwise. 5
5see Ockham (1983) p. 99.
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Ockham’s solution touches precisely on this point: he does not reject the
principle but suggests a restriction of it. On the other hand, he maintains
that God knows already, or from the beginning of time, which future events
are going to happen. Again, since knowledge implies truth, saying that God
knows that p will be the case amounts to saying that it is true now that p will
be the case. Thus, propositions about the future already have a truth-value,
even if we ignore which one, and the principle of bivalence is preserved.
Indeed, throughout his Tractatus Ockham maintains that bivalence is the
rationale of divine foreknowledge.
Ockham observes that one can block determinism and preserve the con-
tingency of the future by limiting the universality of (PNP). This principle
should only hold for the past and present tensed propositions which are not
“equivalent” with any future tensed ones.6 Formally speaking, we should
not be allowed to derive, from propositions like
Pp→ 2Pp
instances like
PFp→ 2PFp
by unrestricted substitution. Blocking such a free substitution and invali-
dating formulas like the last one is precisely what qualifies a logical solution
as Ockhamist.
3 Prior’s Ockhamism
Chapter VII of Prior (1967) offers a first axiomatization of an Ockhamist
temporal logic. One of the axioms of this system is the formula p→ 2p, of
which (PNP) is an instance. But this schema does not allow substitution
of formulas containing the F operator, i.e. we may derive from it instances
like Pp→ 2Pp but not PFp→ 2PFp.7
In chapter VII we also find the first formulation of a sound semantics for
this system: the nowadays universally adopted tree-like models for branching
time. These models represent time as
6Equivalence is to be understood in the same sense in which “it was the case yesterday
that I will quit smoking in two days” is equivalent with “I will quit smoking tomorrow”.
7To be precise, Prior uses here a more expressive temporal language with metric oper-
ators Fn (“it will be the case in n intervals of time”) and Pm (“it was the case m intervals
ago”), where n and m are two quantifiable variables to be interpreted with (rational or
real) non-negative numbers measuring intervals of time. For the sake of simplicity we will
avoid using metric operators, since F , P and 2 are sufficient for the points we need to
make.
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. . . a line without beginning or end which may break up into
branches as it moves from left to right (i.e. from past to future),
though not the other way; so that from any point there is only
one route to the left (into the past) but possibly a number of
alternative routes to the right.8
From Prior’s point of view this semantics is just a heuristic or pedagogical
device and was not intended to constitute an alternative representation of
the Ockhamist logic.9 On the contrary, the proof-theoretic approach was
meant to replace and absorb the fictional representation and reification of
time which is carried by a model-theoretic representation. Nonetheless, as
we said, these structures have nowadays become such a universal tool that,
with the risk of being injust to Prior, we will base our analysis on them. We
therefore define the Ockhamist logic O as the set of all formulas which are
valid in the class of the Ockhamist models that we are going to present.
Central to Prior’s definition is the notion of a tree-like structure T , like
the one depicted in Figure 1, which is a pair 〈T,<〉, where T is a set of
moments m,m′ . . . and < is a strict ordering relation (i.e. irreflexive, tran-
sitive and asymmetrical) over T , where the <-predecessors of any point m
are totally ordered by < and where the intuitive meaning of m < m′ is “m
precedes m′”. A history h is a maximal chain in T for the relation <. The
•m2p h0
•m1
66
((
•m−1 // •m0
<<
**
•m3p h1
•m4¬p h2
Figure 1: A model for branching time
set of histories h1, h2, . . . in T will be denoted by H(T ). Given a moment
8See Prior (1967) p. 126
9This is probably one reason why Prior does not even face the question of completeness.
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m, Hm will designate the set of all histories containing it. Note already that
if m < m′ then Hm′ ⊆ Hm.
A history h represents a specific and well determined course of events,
relative to which every proposition is true or false at m, including those
about the future. We can formally represent that by an evaluation function
V , which assigns a subset of T ×H(T ) to every propositional variable p (see
Fig. 1). A further requirement is that, given a moment m, V does not varies
with the different histories in Hm, i.e. we have
(Uniqueness) 〈m,h〉 ∈ V (p) if and only if for all h′ ∈ Hm, 〈m,h′〉 ∈ V (p)
We can then define an Ockhamist model M = 〈T,<, V 〉 for our tensed
language by extending V in the following way:
M, 〈m,h〉 |= p iff 〈m,h〉 ∈ V (p)
M, 〈m,h〉 |= ¬φ iff M, 〈m,h〉 6|= φ
M, 〈m,h〉 |= φ ∧ ψ iff M, 〈m,h〉 |= φ and M, 〈m,h〉 |= ψ
M, 〈m,h〉 |= Pφ iff ∃m′ < m such that M, 〈m′, h〉 |= φ
M, 〈m,h〉 |= Fφ iff ∃m′ > m such that M, 〈m′, h〉 |= φ
M, 〈m,h〉 |= 2φ iff ∀h′(h′ ∈ Hm ⇒M, 〈m,h′〉 |= φ)
Evaluating a future tensed proposition Fp w.r.t. a moment and a history
amounts to checking if p is satisfied “later on” in the same history. The gen-
eral idea behind this is that when we talk about the future we actually pick a
prima facie course of events h as being the most plausible candidate among
all possible futures. Historical necessity is instead equated with “truth in
all histories” and, given the uniqueness condition, it is easy to check that
present and past-tensed propositions (e.g. p, Pp, PPp etc.) are, if true,
necessary.
O can easily distinguish among contingent and settled truths about the
future. Indeed, contingent sentences like Fp (“there will be a sea-battle”)
may very well be true but not necessary : in our model 〈m0, h0〉 |= Fp but
〈m0, h0〉 |= ¬2Fp. Ockhamist semantics also respects the intuition that
some sentences about the future, like (2) (see introduction), can be true in a
stronger sense, i.e. also necessary, when they hold in all possible branches.
This is a fortiori the case of logical tautologies >: both > and 2> are valid
in Ockhamist models, for tautologies are true at every pair 〈m,h〉.
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It is easy to verify that (PNP) does not hold in general in this semantics
and in particular, as claimed by Ockham, it fails for sentences containing a
reference to the future. Indeed, as the reader may check, in the model of Fig-
ure 1 at the moment m0 we have 〈m0, h0〉 |= PFp but 〈m0, h0〉 |= ¬2PFp.
Nevertheless, in accordance with Ockham, (PNP) is valid for propositions
which are “not equivalent to future-tensed ones”, in our case those not con-
taining any operator F .10
We may notice that retrogradation of truth is secured by the fact that
p → PFp is valid in the Ockhamist semantics. More generally, we can
easily account for sentences like (3) in section 1, which can be translated as
p ∧ PFp ∧ P¬2Fp and which are true at 〈m2, h0〉 in our model.
Complex propositions like (4) make plural references to different possible
futures at different points in the tree. Here too, Ockhamism is powerful
enough to express its truth conditions. For example, (4) can be translated
by the formula Fh∧3F (t∧3Fh∧F (t∧2Ft)).11 This formula is satisfied
at 〈m0, h2〉 by the model in Figure 2.
•m3t h0
•m2t
::
•m1t
;;
// •m4h h1
•m−1 // •m0
;;
++ •m5h h2
Figure 2: Heads and tails.
The intuition behind (5) of section 1 is that we should also be able
to refer to this precise moment in courses of events which are, properly
speaking, no more possible: this is the sense of a counterfactual with a false
10Finer-grained distinctions are induced in Prior’s actual system by the use of metric
operators.
11Where h means “the coin lands head” and t stands for “the money lands tail”.
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antecedent. In the Ockhamist semantics this can be expressed in many cases
by moving back and forth along the branches. The truth conditions of (5)
can be “mimicked” by p ∧ P3F¬p,12 which is indeed satisfied in the model
of Figure 1 at 〈m2, h0〉. Nonetheless, not all counterfactuals seem to be
expressible, as (5), by simple combinations of F , P and 2. We will come
back to this point in section 6.
To resume, Prior’s Ockhamism is a very expressive framework that en-
ables the distinction between contingent and settled propositions about the
future. But there is a major philosophical objection against it, which con-
cerns the notion of a prima facie course of events. Since, at m, all histories
in Hm are equally possible, it is not clear how one should be able to sin-
gle out any one of them. However, according to many, when talking about
future events, we need to refer to the actual future. But in this semantics
(and also in Prior’s view) there is no such a thing. The main problem with
it seems to be its neutrality between two opposite views: one according to
which there is no designated course of events, and the other which, on the
contrary, allows one to refer to the actual course of events. Peirceanism and
Actualism are meant to bear these opposite stands in a more radical way.
4 The Peircean system
Restricting (PNP) is not the only way to block arguments for determinism.
As one may evince from Ockham’s argument, it is also crucial that God is
able to know in the past what will happen later. This is only possible if we
assume that p→ PFp is valid. The latter is an uncontroversial principle of
minimal temporal logics, but not of Prior’s Peircean logic.13 The Peircean
system P was favored by Prior over O as the only one which fleshes out the
intuition that the future is not “real” until it becomes present14, the only
exception being represented by that parcel of the future which is already
present in its causes.
Prior introduces the idea behind P as a variant of the traditional solution
(rejecting bivalence to save indeterminism), where a different interpretation
of the F operator plays, in some peculiar sense, the role usually ascribed to
a third truth-value or a truth-value gap. A Peircean model is easily obtained
from an Ockhamist one by modifying the clause for F as follows:
12This translation is not completely faithful. A metric language can better express (5)
with p ∧ Pn3Fnp.
13See Prior (1967) chap. VII p. 132.
14See Prior (1966).
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M, 〈m,h〉 |= Fφ iff ∀h′((h′ ∈ Hm)⇒ ∃m′(m < m′ ∧M, 〈m′, h′〉 |= φ))
Again, we identify P with the set of all formulas valid in the class of
Peircean models. Fp now means something like “given any course of events,
it will be the case that p”. The intuition is that, speaking about the future,
it does not make sense to pick up any prima facie designated history, since
all possible futures stand on a par from the present standpoint. F has
now the same meaning as the expression 2F in O: indeed P can be seen
as a fragment of it. Thereby, P is also bivalent and the law of excluded
middle holds also for future contingent propositions, i.e. Fp ∨ ¬Fp is valid.
But, contrary to the Ockhamist semantics, Fp ∨ F¬p can very well fail as
well as ¬Fp → F¬p (but its converse holds).15 The Peircean solution has
some counterintuitive backups: future “necessary” propositions like (2) are
still true, but future contingent ones like (1) are now simply false (consider
the model in Figure 1 as a Peircean model). Nonetheless, one may still
distinguish between necessarily false propositions, those φs for which both
¬Fφ and F¬φ are true, and contingently false ones, those φs for which both
¬Fφ is true but F¬φ is not.
It is easy to check that p→ PFp is no more valid. Thus retrogradation of
truth is undermined. In general, propositions like (3), saying that something
“was going to be the case” are regarded simply as (bad) façons de parler
to express the fact that something is now the case. Similar problems arise
for (4) and (5) and many other examples. In general, since P is a proper
fragment of O, it seems that the Peircean is committed to a “deflationist”
view about temporal truth, according to which many sentences we commonly
express in natural language are simply misleading paraphrases.
5 Actualism
All along his Tractatus Ockham seems to presuppose that there is, among all
possible future courses of events, a designed actual future, a sort of thin red
line among all other branches16, that God already knows from all eternity.
This designed history should be, contrary to Prior’s claims, not only a prima
facie one. Adherence to Ockham’s word is not the only reason to stipulate
15It should also be noticed that the Peircean sense of “it will always be the case that” is
no more expressed by the combination ¬F¬, thus G has to be defined as a new primitive
operator by the following clause
M, 〈m,h〉 |= Gφ iff ∀h′∀m′((h′ ∈ Hm ∧m < m′)⇒M, 〈m′, h′〉 |= φ)
16This famous expression was coined by Belnap and Green (1994).
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such a special history. It seems that we often refer to this unique entity
in order to make sense of peculiar sentences such as “Tomorrow I will quit
smoking, even if all evidence speaks against that”.17
There are different possible ways of defining an actualist semantics in a
branching structure (see Barcellan and Zanardo (1999) and Braüner et al.
(2000)), but all of them must fulfill some natural requirements. First of all,
looking at sentences like (4), it seems clear that a model should not only
specify a designated branch corresponding to “the true history”, but also
many others: one for every counterfactual moment t. Following Barcellan
and Zanardo (1999), we define an actualist semantics on the basis of an
Ockhamist model via a function A(t) from T to H(T ), which picks the
actual future at a moment m. Then we define an actual future operator fA
with the following clause:
M, 〈m,h〉 |= fAφ iff ∃m′ ∈ A(m)(m < m′ ∧M, 〈m′,A(m)〉 |= φ)
This function is supposed to respect some natural constraints, the most
immediate being
TRL1 m ∈ A(m)
and the second being the condition of “coherence”
TRL2 ∀m1,m2(m1 < m2 → A(m1) = A(m2))
According to Belnap and Green (1994), such conditions generate some
serious problems of inconsistency for the actualist conception. If we put
together TRL1 and TRL2 the order < is forced to be linear. On the other
hand, they claim, if we discard TRL2 we obtain “unreasonable results”,
e.g. we invalidate many natural principles such as (a) PPφ → Pφ, (b)
fAfAφ→ fAφ and (c) φ→ PfAφ.18
TRL2 is actually a strong coherence condition; Barcellan and Zanardo
(1999) showed that we can instead reasonably opt for the weaker
TRL2* ∀m1,m2(m1 < m2 ∧m2 ∈ A(m1)→ A(m1) = A(m2))
and escape most of the “unreasonable results”. They also add the further
condition
TRL3 there exists an m∗ such that for all m < m∗, A(m) = A(m∗)
17For a more accurate discussion of this point see Hasle and Øhrstrom (1995) and
Øhrstrom et al. (1998).
18See Belnap and Green (1994) p. 380
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where A(m∗) defines the unique “real” history of the model.19 It is possible
to check that this definition preserves many temporal laws such as (a) and
(b). The formula (c) φ → PfAφ is not valid instead – as an example,
consider the failure of t → PfAt at m1 in the model in figure 3 – but is
nonetheless satisfied at any moment of A(m∗). An additional problem for
•m3t h0
•m2t
6>
•m1t
7?
// •m4h h1
•m−1 +3 •m0
;;
'/ •m5h h2
Figure 3: Failure of φ → PfAφ. Double arrows indicate each moment’s
actual future.
this semantics is that it cannot properly block (PNP) for, as one may easily
check,
fAφ→ 2fAφ
is a valid formula, as well as its converse. From this point of view, actualism
is not completely Ockhamist. In order to make (PNP) fail and express
(1)-(5) one should enrich the language with other future tense operators.20
To summarize, the major “logical” inconvenience of the actualist opera-
tor fA is that when we combine it with P and 2 many “natural” principles
seem to fail and we have to recur to other future operators to adjust them.
But it is fair to notice that failures of “intuitive” principles are not specific
of fA and that they at least do not seem to lead to an “inconsistency” of
the actualist conception.21 From a more metaphysical standpoint, the most
common objection to actualism, in this or other forms, is that it involves a
19For a proof of uniqueness see Barcellan and Zanardo (1999) p. 5.
20Barcellan and Zanardo use the peircean operators of section 2 as primitives.
21For a more articulated defence of actualism see Øhrstrom (2009).
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commitment to facts “that do not supervene upon any physical, chemical or
psychological states of affairs” (Belnap and Green (1994)).
6 T × W semantics
Branching time semantics are not the only possible “technical” solution for
preserving future contingency and bivalence. Another option is represented
by T×W semantics, introduced in Thomason (1984).22 Whereas branching-
time is based on the idea of overlapping histories, T ×W starts from the
intuition of there being a plurality of separated possible courses of events
(or worlds) which may have “equivalent” past histories up to a point and
diverge afterwards.23 The models of figure 3 represent this difference.
h
2 
  m 
 p 
h
1 
(a) a tree-like model
  m 
h
2 
h
1 
p 
  m 
(b) a T ×W model
Figure 4: Ockhamist models
For a formal definition, we need a set T of moments, an irreflexive linear
order < on it, a set W of possible worlds and a family {∼t| t ∈ T} of
equivalence relations among them, intuitively denoting sameness up to a
certain point in time t. A frame is a tuple 〈T ×W,<, {∼t}t∈T 〉 where
• T ×W is the set of 〈t, w〉 such that t ∈ T and w ∈W
• for all t ∈ T , ∼t is an equivalence relation
• for all t′ ∈ T , if w ∼t w′ and t′ < t then w ∼t′ w′
22Complete logical systems for this semantics have been formulated later by von
Kutschera (1997) and Di Maio and Zanardo (1998).
23For the notions of overlap and divergence see the famous Lewis (1986) pp. 198-209.
13
Given a valuation V , assigning to every p a subset of W × T , a model
is obtained by expanding V to a satisfaction relation in the usual way for
Boolean and temporal operators (e.g. 〈t, w〉 |= Fφ iff for some t′ > t,
〈t′, w〉 |= φ) and defining the 2-clause as:
〈t, w〉 |= 2φ iff for all w′ such that w ∼t w′, 〈t, w′〉 |= φ
Necessity at 〈t, w〉 means truth at the “same” moment in all other equivalent
histories. We get the Ockhamist notion of historical necessity by an adequate
specification of ∼t as “sharing the same past up to t” i.e.
w ∼t w′ iff for all t′ ≤ t, 〈t′, w′〉 and 〈t′, w〉 satisfy the same propositional
letters.
It is relevant to notice that under some specific conditions a branching Ock-
hamist model can be tranformed into a T ×W -model in a truth preserving
way. This happens when we have a synchronized tree, i.e. a tree whose
branches are all isomorphic.24 Under this condition the T ×W semantics
is at least as expressive as the Ockhamist semantics of Section 3, i.e. we
can account in the same way for the truth conditions of (1)-(5), and even
more.25 Indeed, in T×W necessity operators are defined via a more arbitrary
equivalence relation among histories, which does not force the uniqueness
condition (see Section 3). Therefore, one is free to define new necessity and
possibility operators by relaxing or making more accurate the equivalence
relations. Relaxing the equivalence relation allows to quantify over histories
that diverge even before a given moment m. By this means, it is possible
24More precisely, a synchronized tree is a tree-like structure where it is possible to define
a partition I (the “instants”) of the set T that satisfies the following conditions (see also
Wölfl (2002)):
(a) For every i ∈ I and every h ∈ H(T ) there is exactly one mi,h ∈ T with mi,h ∈ i ∩ h
(b) For all i, i′ ∈ I and all h, h′ ∈ H(T ), from mi,h < mi′,h it follows that mi,h′ < mi′,h′
Given a synchronized Ockhamist model T = 〈T,<, V 〉 we can define a T ×W model
T ′ = 〈T ′ ×W ′, <′, {∼t}t∈T , V ′〉 by taking:
• T ′ = I and W ′ = H(T )
• i <′ i′ iff mi,h < mi′,h for some h ∈ H(T )
• h ∼i h′ iff mi,h = mi,h′
• 〈i, h〉 ∈ V ′(p) iff 〈mi,h, h〉 ∈ V (p)
and it is straightforward to check that T , 〈m,h〉 |= φ if and only if T ′, 〈m,h〉 |= φ.
25The situation is more complex if the tree is not synchronized. For an accurate study
of the relationships between branching-time semantics and T ×W see Wölfl (2002).
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to handle propositions like “for all that I know it could have been raining
last night”, where the construction “for all that I know . . . ” is to be read
as an epistemic possibility operator. Here, indeed, we are driven to consider
as epistemic alternatives more histories than those which share the same
past.26 The case of counterfactuals presents analogous features.27
7 Conclusions
We have presented four logical systems which deal with a perennial philo-
sophical problem: the problem of future contingents. Apart from tackling
the problem in a rigorous way, the four logical approaches have the same
model-theoretical format. This makes the solutions comparable and allows
us to see what are the gains and losses in terms of expressivity, the re-
lation between future contingents and the principle of bivalence, and the
metaphysical commitments we make.
The system T ×W has at least the same expressive power as the Ock-
hamist semantics, but it has received scarce attention or has even been
fiercely opposed. Thomason himself dismissed it in the very same paper
in which he introduced it Thomason (1984). Most of the reasons for this
attitude are grounded in metaphysical considerations. Whereas branching
time is regarded as a misleading but almost an adequate representation of
McTaggart’s A-series conception, T ×W is instead associated with the B-
series conception and seems to commit to a reification of time.28 Moreover,
quantification over non actual and non overlapping histories is seen by many
26See also Iacona (2009).
27The same “redefinitions” of necessity and possibility operators can of course be carried
out, in principle, also in an Ockhamist model. However, this goes against one of the
philosophical motivations behind the branching time semantics, according to which all
tensed constructions ought to be expressed with reference to points in time that are
connected to the present point of evaluation – by some (back and forth) path over the
temporal tree. This requirement may be too restrictive when we need to consider, e.g.,
fictional alternatives or histories diverging in the far past.
28The notions of A-series and B-series were introduced by McTaggart (1908). The A-
series conception of time, also called the dynamic view, resumes the way we experience
time by being “in a flux” and opens up to presentism – a view that McTaggart himself
did not endorse – where only the (constantly changing) “now” properly exists. According
to this conception past, present, and future tenses are primitive concepts for referring to
events in time. Other temporal concepts such as instants in time and the earlier-later
relation between them, are to be derived from the formers. On the other hand, according
to the B-series conception – which accounts for a “bird-eye view” of time and according
to which the entire series of instants exists – instants and their earlier-later relation are
the primitive concepts and tenses are derived from them.
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as an additional commitment to modal realism (i.e. the philosophical thesis
that non actual worlds are real or exist on a par with the actual one). To
many, overlap seems more faithful to an intuitive notion of causality : at any
moment m there is just one past that we cannot change or influence and
many possible futures we can “act upon” and “decide which one to take”.
In T ×W , at any point, there is just one future; contingency and causal in-
fluence on the future seem to be definable only in terms of a counterfactual
dependence29, i.e. in terms of what would happen if the actual course of
events were different.
In response to the criticisms against T × W one may point out that
it is not clear how the choice of a particular semantics should commit us
to a certain ontology. Additionally, it does not seem that other bivalent
approaches like Ockhamism and Actualism are safe from these problems: if
bivalence holds and truth is relative to a particular course of events then
we are just one step far from admitting that other courses of events are
fictional ones, and that the metaphor of branching seems just an unsuccessful
compromise. T × W keeps the order of truth and the order of causality
on two separate plans. Peirceanism, with a radically different definition of
truth for future tensed propositions, seems to be the only radical alternative.
However, defenders of Peirceanism face at least two burdens: they should
deal with a less expressive language and have to find a justification for the
strange asymmetry which makes it that future contingents are just false.
Non-bivalent approaches admitting truth-value gaps for future contingents,
as the one defined in Thomason (1970) and which Prior hoped for30, seem
to be the only possible way to fully preserve symmetry between truth and
falsity.
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